Revenue structures and the question of who pays taxes : understanding the conditions under which elites pay taxes in developing countries by Schiller, Armin von
17/2012Discussion Paper
Revenue Structures and the Question
of Who Pays Taxes
Understanding the conditions under which 
elites pay taxes in developing countries
Armin von Schiller
 
 Revenue structures and the question of who 
pays taxes 
Understanding the conditions under which elites pay 
taxes in developing countries 











Die deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie;  
detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über http://dnb.d-nb.de abrufbar. 
The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed  







Armin von Schiller, German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE), 









© Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik gGmbH 
Tulpenfeld 6, 53113 Bonn 
 +49 (0)228 94927-0 





This paper serves as background document for three country studies to be carried out with-
in the project “Mobilising domestic revenue in developing countries”. It has benefitted 
from very helpful comments by Jörg Faust, Stefan Leiderer, Mark Hallerberg and Mark 
Kayser. Special thanks go to Christian von Haldenwang for the numerous fruitful discus-
sions on the topic. 
 
Contents 
1  Introduction 3 
2  Research gap and theoretical approach 5 
2.1. Limitations in explaining variance in revenue structures among  
 developing countries 5 
2.2. Analytical approach: complementing the democracy and redistribution  
 approach 8 
2.2.1  Patterns of interaction among elites  9 
2.2.2  Different incentives for elites to pay taxes and the potential of positive  
 drivers of taxation  10 
2.2.3  The role of the government in negotiating contributions of elites  12 
3  A model for tax contributions of elites 14 
3.1. The logic of the main model 14 
3.2. Factionalism and the contributions of elites 16 
3.3. Information availability and the contributions of elites 18 
3.4. The government’s credibility and its capacity to increase the  
 contributions of elites 20 









Revenue structures and the question of who pays taxes 





Revenue structures vary strongly among developing countries. Most approaches to tax 
performance fail to give insights into this puzzle. I argue that much of the answer lies in 
the political dimension and I highlight the willingness of elites to pay taxes as being the 
most relevant factor.  
In contrast to common political economy arguments stressing the relevance of external 
pressure in explaining tax contributions of elites, I examine how characteristics of the 
interaction among elites themselves are important aspects to take into account. This shift 
in the attention from the bargaining between the elites and non-elites to the bargaining 
among elites allows me to focus on the effect of three often overlooked factors: level of 
factionalism among elites; information about other elites’ tax contributions; and the 
credibility of the state as negotiation partner.  
The analysis of the formal model I propose shows that factionalism among the elite 
coalition as well as information availability about other elites’ contributions have a 
negative effect on the level of tax contributions. On the contrary, the credibility of the 
government can have a positive effect on the elites’ tax contributions and partly limits the 
previously identified negative effect of factionalisation. 
Three main policy implications can be derived from this analysis. First, improving the 
credibility of governments in partner countries seems crucial, and this is a goal in which 
development cooperation can play a major role. Second, connected to this effort, 
development cooperation must contribute to the identification and emergence of positive 
drivers of taxation as an avenue to increase the performance and the fairness of tax 
systems simultaneously. Third, taking seriously the idea that politics matters for taxation 
implies that in order to support higher-performing and fairer tax systems, often a strategy 
based on partly aligning with elites’ interests will be the most efficient and promising 
alternative. However, the potential effect of this strategy on other development goals and 
future development paths of partner countries calls for a cautious trade-off analysis. 
Overall, this paper stresses the idea that development cooperation cannot perceive politics 
as an obstacle to be overcome, but rather as a necessary part of the solution. Hence, a 
proper consideration and understanding of what is politically feasible is crucial, and this 
goal will necessarily require dealing with the question of why and under which 
circumstances elites accept higher tax performance in general and higher own tax 
contributions in particular. 
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1 Introduction  
Many approaches to taxation are able to explain differences between revenue structures in 
developed and developing countries.1 However, these same approaches are far less 
conclusive in explaining the empirically remarkable variances in revenue structures among 
developing countries that share similar economic conditions. For example, why did direct 
taxation in Colombia between 1995 and 2005 represent 39 per cent of the total tax 
revenue, whereas it represented only 26 per cent in Peru?2  
The role of political factors in explaining the characteristics of tax systems in developed 
countries has been extensively researched in comparative political economy.3 
Surprisingly, in the discussion about tax systems in the developing world, it is precisely 
these factors that have been neglected; the focus, rather, has been on economic and 
administrative ones. Still, when particularly striking tax performances are discussed, 
vague references to aspects such as political will are common. Against this background, 
this paper provides a consistent argumentative framework for including political factors in 
the explanation of tax performance in developing countries. I argue that tax regimes in 
developing countries strongly mirror the preferences of a reduced number of actors, the 
elites, due to the concentration of political and economic power. Consequently, variances 
in revenue structures among structurally similar countries is best explained by the 
willingness of elites to pay taxes, and, accordingly, the more elites are willing to 
contribute to the tax effort, the more relevant the role of tax types that predominantly 
target them will be in the revenue mix.  
I approach tax contributions of elites as a policy outcome that represents a self-enforcing 
political equilibrium.4 Hence, the level of the tax contributions is not the result of a tax 
law negotiated independently from the elites and imposed on them from the outside. 
Rather, it should be conceived as an amount that elites accept to pay in a given strategic 
constellation.5 This is not a new approach to taxation but, in contrast to the common 
political economy approach, the one proposed here shifts the attention from the bargaining 
between the elites and non-elites6 to the bargaining among the elite coalition sustaining the 
socio-political order. Moreover, I explicitly acknowledge the often overlooked role of the 
                                                 
1  For an analysis of the differences among developed and developing countries, see for instance 
Baunsgaard / Keen (2010) and Gordon / Li (2009). A summary of the debate on competing explanations 
for existing differences can be found in von Haldenwang / Ivanyna (2010) and Profeta / Scabrosetti 
(2010).  
2  Own calculation based on the OECD-ECLAC-CIAT database “Revenue Statistics in Latin America 
1990–2009” (2011). Data are for the central government, and include tax on income, profits and capital 
gains. Data are available at http://stats.oecd.org/. 
3  See Cusack (1997); Hallerberg / Basinger (1998); Steinmo / Tolbert (1998); Gould (2001); Swank / 
Steimno (2002); Persson / Tabellini (2002); Basinger / Hallerberg (2004); Mulligan / Gil / Sala-I-Martin 
(2004); Iversen / Soskice (2006) and Beramendi / Rueda (2007). 
4  The idea that the reality of taxation in a particular country reflects a “political equilibrium” is put 
forward by many authors (e.g. Bird / Martinez-Vazquez / Torgler 2008).  
5  For a detailed discussion of the idea of self-enforcing equilibria (although applied to the study of 
democratisation processes) see Przeworski (1991) and Weingast (1997). Scharf / Perroni (2007) discuss 
the relevance and pertinence of such a theoretical approach focussing on tax constitutions. 
6  For example, Boix (2003) and Acemoglu / Robinson (2006a) use the concept of the wealthy and the 
poor, which to a certain degree overlaps with the idea of elites and non-elites. 
Armin von Schiller 
4 German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 
government as an independent actor and consider the possibility that elites can have 
incentives to pay taxes aside from those of self-protection and appeasing the general 
population. 
The analysis of the formal model I develop in Chapter 3 indicates that, assuming stable 
contextual factors, the overall contribution by elites will decrease with its increasing 
factionalisation. Moreover, available information about other elites’ contributions also 
reduces the amount of one’s own contribution. Finally, a credible government can achieve 
– by directly and individually negotiating with particular elites – an increase in their 
contributions that outweighs the negative effect of factionalisation.  
Thus, the implications of the analysis could be interpreted in rather pessimistic terms. 
First, factionalisation and information availability appear to lead to lower tax contributions 
from elites. As these aspects are somehow connected to the idea of pluralism and 
transparency, this implies that under certain circumstances, the process of socio-political 
development can condemn developing countries to lower-performing and more unfair tax 
systems. Second, the government’s ability to counteract this trend requires demanding 
preconditions and a partial alignment of state action with the interests of privileged 
segments of the society. The impact of doing so on the achievement of other development 
goals, like good governance, as well and on the future development path of partner 
countries, is difficult to evaluate.  
More optimistically, based on the idea of positive drivers of taxation, circumstances under 
which elites endogenously accept to pay more taxes for state action benefiting the general 
population do exist, and international development can play a major role in promoting 
their emergence.  
This paper adds to the growing academic literature on political determinants of taxation in 
developing countries in two regards.7 First, it complements this literature by accentuating 
the agency element and by highlighting the existing room for manoeuvre for actors under 
similar structural constraints. Second, the focus on bargaining among the elites offers a 
promising venue to explain differences in tax performance and revenue structures among 
structurally similar developing countries.8  
The results have relevant policy implications for development cooperation. The 
international development community is increasingly recognising the centrality of 
effective taxation to inclusive and sustainable development (UN Millennium Project 2005; 
United Nations 2003, 2008). In particular, higher-performing tax systems are crucial for 
governments in developing countries to cope with challenges such as poverty reduction, 
provision of public services, infrastructure development and climate change. All actors 
                                                 
7  Bird / Martinez-Vazquez / Torgler (2008); Cheibub (1998); Davoodi / Grigorian (2007); Di John / 
Putzel (2009); Di John (2010); Lieberman (2003); Moore (2004, 2008); Prichard (2009); Gordon / Li 
(2009); Garcia / von Haldenwang (forthcoming). 
8  The accent on intra-elite bargains, instead of on bargains between elites and non-elites, is gaining 
attention in the academic debate as an approach to explain policy choices in general, especially in 
autocracies and nanocracies (e.g. Gehlbach / Keefer 2011). Although not all developing countries are 
autocracies by any means, it seems reasonable to consider that, on average, the disproportionate 
influence of elitarian groups upon political choices is more relevant in developing countries than in 
developed ones, regardless of the particular political regime. 
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involved are aware that improving tax performance is both a technical and a political 
issue, but still, all too often the political nature of the challenge is neglected or 
downplayed. With this in mind, the present paper sheds light on key aspects to help 
understand the conditions under which a higher-performing and fairer tax system serving 
the interests of the general population is politically feasible.  
The structure of this paper is developed as follows: following the introduction, Chapter 2 
presents the existing literature on revenue structures in developing countries and 
highlights the key distinctions between the proposed theoretical approach and previous 
ones. In Chapter 3, I develop a formal model for the tax contributions of elites and discuss 
the effect of factionalisation, information availability and credible governments on them. 
The final chapter concludes by emphasising the importance of carefully understanding 
existing power constellations in order to identify the most efficient, effective and coherent 
strategy for development cooperation to improve taxation in these countries.  
2 Research gap and theoretical approach  
This chapter presents the analytical approach on which the formal model of elites’ 
contributions discussed in the following chapter is based. I proceed in two steps. First, I 
discuss the limitations of the three main approaches that have dominated the debate on 
taxation in developing countries (the economic, the administrative and the political 
economy approach). Second, I discuss how three aspects – namely patterns of interaction 
among elites, positive and negative drivers of taxation, and the credibility of a government 
– contribute to explain better the variance in revenue collection and tax performance in 
developing countries. 
2.1. Limitations in explaining variance in revenue structures among developing 
countries  
When explaining revenue structures in developing countries, three main approaches prevail: 
an economic approach, an administrative approach and a political economy approach.9 
The economic approach focusses on the economic conditions characterising developing 
countries as constraints for the performance of certain taxes. For instance, the economic 
structure in many developing countries is characterised by the relevance of hard-to-tax 
sectors (e.g. agriculture) and high levels of informality (Burgess / Stern 1993; Tanzi / Zee 
2000). As a result, so the argument, due to the characteristics of the tax handles available 
in these countries, the tax systems tend to be more dependent on indirect taxes and taxes 
on foreign trade.10  
                                                 
9  This division of approaches, as well as the presentation of them, strongly relies on Di John (2006). It is 
important to underline that, in practice, the differentiation between approaches is difficult, as scholars 
tend to mix elements of them.  
10  Gupta (2007); Stotsky / WoldeMarian (1997); Ghura (1998); Tanzi / Davoodi (2000); Lledó / Schneider / 
Moore (2004); Gillis (1989). 
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This approach offers a good explanation of why tax collection in developed and 
developing countries differs. However, it is unable to explain why revenue structures 
differ among countries with similar economies. In this line, a major limitation, as Di John 
underscores, is that “the economic approach abstracts from the political and institutional 
processes that determine the ability of the state to create tax policies and enforce them” 
(2006). 
The aspect of enforcement is taken up prominently by the second approach: the 
administrative approach. The main argument here stresses the limitations of the 
bureaucratic apparatus to extract taxes in an efficient and effective way. Accordingly, the 
deficiencies of public administration are the core topic (Bird 2004).11 The essence of this 
approach is best summarised in the famous statement by Casanegra de Jantscher that “in 
developing countries, tax administration is tax policy” (quoted in International Monetary 
Fund 2011).  
The indication that having proper means and institutions to implement tax policies is at 
least as relevant as the design of the policies themselves represents a valuable contribution 
of this approach. Yet, it ignores that the viability and the effect of administrative reform is 
conditional to the political context, as well as the debate about the conditions under which 
political regimes invest in tax capacity (e.g. Besley / Persson 2011, 40–102). Therefore, 
from a policy perspective, overemphasising the relevance of administrative institutions 
presents the risk of putting forward “one-size-fits-all solutions” that overlook required 
preconditions for the successful implementation of administrative reform. In this sense, it 
is not only the political context plays a role, but also the broader cultural and social 
context that can strongly facilitate or hamper reform efforts.12 All in all, although this 
approach provides an explanation for variances in taxation in similar developing countries, 
the main determinant proposed – different administrative capacities – is highly 
endogenous to political variables, and represents, in my opinion, a symptom rather than a 
cause of low tax performance.  
In contrast to the previous approach, the starting point of the political economy approach 
is the idea that “the institutional capacity of states to mobilise resources had to be created” 
(Di John 2006, 7). The perspective shifts from conceptualising taxation as something that 
can be decided upon and imposed by the state, to conceiving it as a self-enforcing outcome 
resulting from political bargaining and power struggles. As a result, the key to 
understanding taxation is gaining an insight into why and how a particular political 
settlement13 was defined in the past and what conditions allow it to be maintained over 
                                                 
11  This approach has strongly influenced the international cooperation active in the field of taxation. 
Following a mapping study by the International Tax Compact Initiative, multilateral financial 
institutions and bilateral aid agencies devoted respectively 40 per cent and 42.5 per cent of their funds in 
the field of taxation to the area on tax administration and organisational reform (International Tax 
Compact 2011, 8).  
12  For example, the tax morale approach highlights the relevance of the social and cultural context. The 
main argument is that the state, regardless of its capacity, will never be able to extract a significant 
amount of resources via taxation by exclusively resorting to the means of deterrence and control (e.g. 
Torgler 2005; Torgler / Schneider 2009). Although increasingly recognised, this approach is not yet very 
present in the literature. 
13  An extensive discussion on the concept is available in OECD (2011) and Khan (2010). 
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time. Historical legacies, institutional settings and power constellations are the main 
factors addressed by this approach. 
Explanations based on historical legacies underscore the role of path dependencies in 
defining the characteristics of taxation in developing countries. From this perspective, the 
characteristics of contemporary tax performance are explained by the constraining effect 
of socio-political patterns that emerged in the past (Acemoglu / Johnson / Robinson 2001; 
Adam / Bevan / Chambas 2001; Mkandawire 2010; Thirsky 1997).  
The idea that socio-economic systems in place today are influenced by the past is very 
intuitive (Bates 2008). In addition, the empirical fact that “where a country ends up in 
terms of both, tax level and tax structure, depends in large part on where it begins” (Bird / 
Zolt 2005, 24) strongly supports it. That being said, a major weakness of this approach is 
the great temporal distance between alleged causes and their effects. For example, 
colonisation patterns surely do have an effect on the political, economic and fiscal realities 
of developing countries today, but this effect should not be overestimated. The enormous 
variance between tax systems (and tax performance) in developing countries with similar 
colonial pasts proves this point.14 All in all, this rationale underestimates the relevance of 
agency in taxation15 and, therefore, has the tendency to be too deterministic. Furthermore, 
it leads to overlooking the much more appealing as well as policy-relevant question of 
why certain countries were able to leave the development path that historical legacies 
dictated. 
Explanations based on institutions have been very prominent in the literature on taxation 
(Bird / Martinez-Vazquez / Torgler 2008; Cheibub 1998; Di John 2006; Kenny / Winer 
2006; Mulligan / Gil / Sala-I-Martin 2004). These kinds of analyses are based on the claim 
that institutions influence the decisions and behaviours of actors by distributing power 
differently, thereby changing their incentives for them.16 The application of this approach 
to developing countries faces a major difficulty: politics in these countries are often far 
less bureaucratised, and informally coded institutions play the predominant role 
(Therkildsen 2001, 111).17 Specifically, in developing countries the incongruence between 
de facto and de jure power is more pronounced.18 Hence, focussing on the effect of 
                                                 
14  For instance, Tanzania and Kenya share comparable historical legacies, economic structures and 
geography (Miguel 2004). However, while Kenya has a mean tax to GDP ratio of 20.8 per cent from the 
period of 1996 to 2008, Tanzania only reached 12.2 per cent. Even more striking is that the mean direct 
tax to GDP ratio for Kenya more than doubles the one for Tanzania in that period – 6.6 against 3.1. 
(Data for tax collection come from the African Economic Outlook (AfDB/OECD 2010); for GDP, data 
come from World Development Indicators: online:  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator. 
15  For example, Di John / Putzel (2009) argue that the characteristics of the political settlements on which 
the regimes in Guatemala and Costa Rica are historically based are crucial in understanding how their 
tax performance developed in extremely different ways, although they started with similar economic 
conditions in the 1950s and 1960s.  
16  Insightful works dealing, at least indirectly, with taxation and institutions are Levi (1988) and North et 
al. (2007).  
17  Therkildsen discusses this in the context of Africa and underlines the work of Bratton / van de Walle 
(1997). Nonetheless, I consider that similar arguments about the role of informal institutions on 
governance and taxation can also be applied to other regions. 
18  See discussion about the divergence between de facto and de jure political power in Acemoglu / 
Robinson (2006b). 
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institutions that define potentially irrelevant de jure powers can be misleading. 
Furthermore, if the effect of institutions is conditional to the political context, the 
comparability among institutions, which look similar on the books, cannot be taken for 
granted. Overall, it seems that in these contexts, there is a need to go one step further than 
formal institutions and analyse the direct effect that diverse distributions of de facto 
political power and “tacit institutions” 19 have on tax systems.  
The third and last perspective within the political economy stream provides a tentative 
solution to the former problem by focussing on pressure politics. This allows not only for 
an approach to taxation that takes into consideration the role of de facto power and 
different power constellations, but also provides a solid framework for estimating the 
prospects for a change of tax regimes. The careful discussion of the microfoundations of 
the arguments20 is also one of its particular strengths. 
The democracy and redistribution literature can be highlighted as the most relevant 
exponent of this third sub-approach (Acemoglu / Robinson 2006a; Boix 2003). The main 
argument is that the stronger the pressure of the general population on the economically 
and politically powerful actors, the higher the tax contributions of the latter will be. This 
simple claim seems plausible and convincing. But whereas this perspective is able to 
explain, at least theoretically, variance among countries with differing socio-political 
conditions, it is not able to explain the variance among countries sharing these conditions. 
Still, differences among these conditions are empirically remarkable. For instance, Brazil 
and Argentina share similar economic structures and wealth levels as well as historical and 
contemporary democracy levels. Nonetheless, in the period between 1990 and 2009, 
whereas the average tax to gross domestic product (GDP) ratio in Argentina was 23 per 
cent, in Brazil it was 29 per cent (OECD et al. 2011).21 I contend that the democracy and 
redistribution argument fails to explain this variance because of the exclusive focus on 
vertical pressure from the general population on the elites, who are understood as a unitary 
actor unequivocally opposed to taxation. 
2.2. Analytical approach: complementing the democracy and redistribution 
approach 
In the following, I discuss three aspects that add to the development of a more nuanced 
view concerning the determinants of tax contributions by elites. These three aspects are: 
                                                 
19  Following Khan, tacit institutions are informal institutions that “describe behavioural regularities of 
individuals or organizations in the game-theoretic sense of ‘equilibrium behaviour’, given the behaviour 
of other individuals and organizations” (2010, 10). Khan also discusses extensively the limits of the new 
institutional approach and elaborates many of the ideas briefly pointed at above.  
20  Hereby, I refer to the idea that “macro-explanations of social phenomena must be supported by an 
account of the mechanisms at the individual level through which the postulated social processes work” 
(Little 1998, 10). In this line, the absence of this dimension in many approaches makes the proposed 
causal mechanisms and arguments often vague and unconvincing.  
21  If we compare the revenue structures and not the aggregated tax to GDP ratios, the differences among 
these two countries increase remarkably. A more systematic analysis of the effect of representation on 
tax collection can be found in Timmons (2010).  
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i) the plural nature of elite coalitions and the relevance of the patterns of interaction 
among them;  
ii) the existence of negative and positive incentives for elites to pay taxes;  
iii) the role of the government in negotiating tax contributions.  
Overall, a thorough consideration of these aspects demands shifting attention from 
bargaining processes between elites and non-elites to bargaining among elites themselves.22 
2.2.1 Patterns of interaction among elites 
In the democracy and redistribution literature, it is often assumed that there is one 
monolithic and unitary group of the “powerful” – a notion that is doubtful. On the one 
hand, powerful actors in a state must share a common understanding as a coalition in order 
to ensure stability and continuity, but on the other hand they will commonly have 
conflicting interests regarding taxation and the role of the state.23 Consequently, a 
collective action challenge exists within the coalition of elites that cannot be ignored.  
How this collective action problem is solved profoundly influences the definition of the 
political settlement sustaining the social and political order, and thereby the prevailing 
idea of the state as well as the limits of state action. Among other things, the political 
settlement will be characterised by patterns of interaction among the members of the 
ruling elite coalition.24 Some scholars have focussed on the patterns of cooperation 
between the government and upper classes as being a determinant of taxation (Di John / 
Putzel 2009; Lieberman 2003). Yet, this approach does not take precise account of the 
interaction among the non-governmental elites. 
To capture patterns of interaction among elites analytically, I propose to situate these 
along a continuum between cohesion and factionalisation.25 On one end of the continuum, 
in a strongly cohesive elite coalition, its members agree and share a detailed view of what 
                                                 
22  Olson made a similar argument when discussing the emergence of democratic regimes. His point is that 
a balance of power “that keeps any one leader or group from assuming total control of a large area or 
jurisdiction” (1993, 573) is not a sufficient condition for the emergence of democratic regimes, as 
small-scale independent autocracies represents another feasible outcome. In this line, in addition to 
balance of power, the interaction and interdependence among different powerful groups is crucial to 
explain the emergence of democratic regimes  
23  Boix addresses the possibility that elites might have divergent interests to some extent by analysing the 
differences between an approach based on a class-cleavage structure and one based on sector-cleavage 
structure (2003, 53–57). However, Boix points out how divergent interests can influence taxation by 
changing the relevant political coalitions, but not how divergent interests among coalition members can 
influence taxation without necessarily dissolving the coalition.  
24  There are many definitions of the concept of political settlement. A particularly useful definition is 
provided by Khan: “A political settlement is a combination of power and institutions that is mutually 
compatible and also sustainable in terms of economic and political viability” (2010, 4). 
25  My conceptualisation of the interaction among elites strongly relies on the concepts of the adversarial 
and cooperative state (Lieberman 2003, 54–60). However, while Lieberman emphasises the interaction 
between the state structures and economic elites, I want to focus on the interaction between different 
elites. 
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the state and the government should do. Hence, all elites agree on precise policy contents. 
In this extreme, the members of the elite coalition act as one actor: a unitary elite 
coalition.26 This does not preclude the existence of conflicting interests but implies that 
mechanisms exist to develop unitary positions that overcome these conflicts. An 
environment in which this kind of cohesive coalition can emerge is, for instance, a one-
party regime. Here, the party serves as a coordination device that imposes a high level of 
coordination and coherence within the coalition. Thus, even though the coalition might 
integrate members with different – and even conflicting – interests, the party enables (and 
forces) the diverse factions to act as one (e.g. Gehlbach / Keefer 2011). 
At the other end of the continuum, in a factionalised elite coalition, its members are 
loosely coordinated. In this case, agreement among the multiple members on policy 
content is not as precisely defined. In the best-case scenario the coalition agrees on certain 
limits of state action and some abstract goals such as peace preservation. However, there is 
no shared vision for proactive state action and policy directions backed by all coalition 
members are poorly developed. For example, limited multiparty regimes as conceived by 
Hadenius / Teorell (2007) can be considered to be based on factionalised elite coalitions. 
In this scenario the most relevant political, economic and social actors share a procedural 
consensus regarding the basic institutions that guide the political process, yet there is often 
an open conflict about policy contents. The procedural consensus provides the rules of the 
games but does not include the policy contents, which are defined in competitive, 
conflictive and iterative bargains among the coalition members (Faust 2010). 
2.2.2 Different incentives for elites to pay taxes and the potential of positive 
drivers of taxation 
Apart from the normative – and naïve – argument that elites pay taxes because laws 
demand it, there appear to be two main reasons for paying taxes. The first reason is fear. 
Fear can come from a number of sources: monetary sanctions, social contempt, legal 
prosecution or even the fear of a change in the social and political order and the associated 
loss of privileges.27 In particular, the idea that elites accept paying certain levels of tax 
contributions, because they expect to be even worse off in the alternative scenario of not 
paying these, is strongly prevalent in academic circles.28  
This claim is based on the assumption that taxation always serves the goal of 
redistribution. More precisely, it presumes that any state actions financed by tax 
contributions above the externally imposed level will never benefit the elites. Assuming 
this redistributive effect of taxation is doubtful. In practice, little can be said about the 
effect of a tax without taking into consideration what the collected resources are used for. 
Suppose, for instance, that particular elites would be able to manipulate state spending and 
state action to serve their interests. In this context, for those elites, contributing to a well-
financed state could indeed be in their best interest.  
                                                 
26  This is the situation that the democracy and redistribution literature commonly assumes. 
27  The latter is well covered by the democracy and redistribution literature (Acemoglu / Robinson 2006a; 
Boix 2003).  
28  The tax morale approach (e.g. Frey / Torgler 2007) is a remarkable exception. 
Revenue structures and the question of who pays taxes 
German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) 11 
A well-documented case of bargaining among economic elites and political representatives around tax 
codes and fiscal policies is found in Chile in the time of its transition to democracy. As Boylan (1996) 
underlines, it was crucial for the success of the negotiations and, furthermore, the political stability of 
Chile that “a farsighted business class seeking economic security could recognize that if demands for 
increased social spending were not met, this failure would threaten the long-term political and economic 
stability of the entire system.” Thus there was an element of fear in their incentives, but also the idea of 
self-privileging by securing long-term political and economic stability is crucial.  
This final thought connects to the other potential reason for elites to pay taxes: self-
privileging. This will come up when elites do not perceive taxes as inevitable costs but 
rather as profitable investments. Two preconditions are requires for taxes to be considered 
profitable investments. First, the expected benefits from the public spending financed by 
one’s own tax contribution must outweigh the tax payment itself; second, channelling the 
resources through the public system must be perceived to be more efficient than privately 
paying for the required services. In this line, in an optimistic tone, Timmons underlines 
that “states benefit from economies of scale in the provision of goods and services 
providing them for less than each individual can provide for herself” (Timmons 2005, 
519). Furthermore, state structures are able to solve coordination games when large-scale 
investments are required.29 
These two reasons for elites to accept paying taxes relate well to the idea of positive and 
negative drivers of taxation. Paraphrasing Hossain / Moore (2002, 10) and applying their 
arguments to the debate about taxation, a negative driver of taxation is a perception by the 
elites that they might be worse off if they do not pay a certain amount of taxes. In contrast, 
a positive driver is a perception that there are potential gains for paying taxes that benefit 
more social groups than just those that are paying.30 
All tax contributions based on fear are connected to the idea of negative drivers of 
taxation. As an example, imagine elites paying taxes to avoid a revolution. The only driver 
behind the acceptance of paying is the fear of the potential revolutionary setting. After 
paying taxes, the elites are not better off than before that, because they do not directly 
benefit from the state spending that their tax contributions enabled. They are only better 
off than in the counterfactual case of not having contributed. Consequently, if there was no 
fear, there would not be any incentive to pay.  
As for positive drivers of taxation, the situation is different: after the implementation of 
the state action financed by paying taxes, the elites having paid are not just better off than 
they would have been in a hypothetical counterfactual situation of not having done so, but 
also better off than before paying taxes. The state action that is enabled by their tax 
contribution does not just defend the elites from a worse scenario, but also creates a more 
positive one from which they directly benefit. 
                                                 
29  The idea that the state can potentially be used to increase benefits or defend the position of certain 
privileged groups can be traced back to Stigler (1971). In addition, the argument developed above can 
be connected to the discussion of stationary and roving bandits by Olson (1993). 
30  A description of the concept of positive and negative drivers can be found in Hossain / Moore (2002). 
They focus on positive and negative drivers in a broader discussion on the political economy of pro-poor 
policies. 
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All tax contributions based on the idea of self-privileging fulfil the condition that elites 
consider paying taxes to be a desirable investment. But not all incentives based on self-
privileging can be considered positive drivers of taxation. To qualify as a positive driver 
of taxation, both the elites contributing via taxes and other social groups have to share an 
expectation of common gain from the financed state action.  
Imagine, for instance, that elites accept paying some amount of taxes only if a certain 
infrastructure that benefits their businesses is built. The elites would expect a gain in 
accepting paying these taxes, but the thereby enabled state action would benefit only these 
particular elites and not the general population. These kinds of “elite capture” cases in 
which the state is instrumentalised to serve only narrowly defined particularistic interests 
do exist, but, as Hossain / Moore (2002) point out, the contrasts between the interests of 
privileged and underprivileged segments of society are commonly overstated. Even in the 
extreme case above, one could argue that the infrastructure as a public good could be used 
for other purposes. In fact there are many sectors in which the overlapping interests of 
elites and the general population are fairly plausible. Under these circumstances, the elites’ 
expectations of particularistic benefits qualify as a positive driver of taxation because the 
employment of the increased tax revenue is used for state action from which the general 
population also benefits.  
Hossain / Moore (2002, 17–18) argue that in the education sector, the interests of elites and the general 
population might converge. Some elites can strongly profit from a well-educated population and the 
population can profit from better employability.31 The authors discuss this in the context of the political 
economy of pro-poor policies, but I consider that a similar argument can be made when discussing the 
political economy of tax performance. Similar arguments can be made concerning investments in 
infrastructure development.  
In conclusion, if we analyse the incentives for elites seriously, at least theoretically there is 
nothing dictating that elites should not have an interest in higher taxation imposed on 
them. If we consider the nature of the elites’ incentives and whether or not the thereby 
financed state action will benefit the general population, we can differentiate between two 
drivers of taxation. First, positive drivers of taxation are characterised by the expectation 
of a common gain for both the elites and the general population. Crucial is that the elites 
increase their tax contributions out of self-interest, but the state action that this enables 
leads also to benefits for the general population. Second, negative drivers of taxation are 
incentivised by fear. Tax contributions based on fear can strongly benefit the general 
population, but elites benefit only indirectly, by avoiding a counterfactual situation. 
Beside these two drivers, elites can increase their tax contributions out of self-interest with 
the goal of achieving state action that only serves their particularistic interests and not the 
interests of the general population at all. This would be a case of elite capture.  
2.2.3 The role of the government in negotiating contributions of elites 
In the democracy and redistribution literature, as well as more generally in the literature 
on taxation in developing countries, there is a tendency to neglect the role of the 
                                                 
31  Ansell (2010) provides an in-depth analysis of the political economy of public spending in education 
and the opposed incentives for elites to providing resources employed towards this goal. 
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government as a proactive independent actor. As far as the democracy and redistribution 
literature is concerned, the origin of this underestimation might lie in the focus on the 
vertical negotiation between the powerful and the powerless, which reduces the 
government to a policy-taker without own initiative. 
The fiscal contract paradigm offers a solid argument for highlighting the role that 
governments can play in shaping the characteristics of taxation. The main idea of the fiscal 
contract paradigm is that “rulers have incentives to reduce the cost of compliance by 
making credible commitments to citizens, giving them a say over policy, providing them 
directly with benefits, and/or investing in ideology, which can substitute for coercion” 
(Timmons 2005, 535). Thus, taxation is conceived as the result of a negotiation process in 
which the governments exchange services for revenue. 
In contrast to Timmons’ approach, which assumes that all bargains between social groups 
and the government are identical, I concentrate on the negotiation between the government 
and the elites for two reasons. First, I consider that the result of this negotiation is crucial 
for understanding tax performance and revenue structures, as it defines the tax 
contribution of the actors that control most of the political and economic power. Second, 
there is one substantial difference between the negotiations of the government with the 
elites and the negotiations with other social groups.  
For the sake of stability and survival, the government – and more broadly the regime – 
needs at least the support of a substantial segment of the elites (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 
2003; Khan 2010).32 Consequently, the bargaining position of the government against 
these crucial actors is weak compared to the one against the general population. Most 
importantly, the threat to act coercively, which is key in understanding why the general 
population pay taxes, is not credible against elites. As a result, elites should be expected to 
pay only as much as they consider convenient and not necessarily the amount that they are 
urged or demanded to. 
Yet, the fact that the government is not able to credibly create negative drivers of taxation 
does not preclude that it can support the emergence of positive drivers of taxation. In fact, 
as it has direct contact with the elites, potentially valuable information about their 
interests, and the capacity to proactively propose and implement attractive policies for 
them, the preconditions to start bargaining with them are positive.    
                                                 
32  For instance, while Khan talks of “the ruling coalition of factions”, Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, 
and Morrow rather use the term “winning coalition”. In essence, both terms refer to the same idea of a 
group of social actors who, by acting in a coordinated fashion, are able to sustain the stability of a 
certain political and social order. This is important to indicate that not necessarily all elites must be 
integrated in these coalitions – a point that this paper does not consider, as for the sake of simplicity I 
use the term “elites” for all actors included in the coalitions. Although the term “winning coalition” 
resonates far more strongly in the academic debate due to its accent on de jure power and the mixed 
empirical evidence of the associated “selectorate theory” (e.g. Clarke / Stone 2008). As I also consider 
that the elite coalition must not necessarily be factionalised, I also refuse Khan’s concept and stick to the 
term “elite coalition”. 
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3 A model for tax contributions of elites 
The previous chapter introduced a theoretical approach to taxation in developing 
countries. The willingness of elite coalition members to pay taxes was highlighted as a 
crucial aspect in explaining the level of tax contribution as well as the variance in revenue 
structures among developing countries. Various factors influencing this willingness to pay 
taxes were also discussed. In this chapter, the focus lies on modelling the level of the 
contributions themselves. I proceed with the help of a formal model. In Section 3.1, I 
present the logic of the main model, which strongly relies on the democracy and 
redistribution argument. In Sections 3.2 to 3.4, the effect of the following three factors on 
elites’ tax contributions are analysed: level of factionalisation among the elites, 
availability of information on other factions’ contributions, and the credibility of 
government.  
3.1. The logic of the main model  
Consider a polity in which the only threat that the general population can use to put 
pressure on the elites to pay taxes is the threat of a revolt.33 The status quo is more 
beneficial for the elite coalition than the alternative scenario of a revolt. The mechanism 
by which the elites can increase the probability of the maintenance of the status quo is by 
financing the state via taxes. This will allow the state to provide certain services that will 
appease the general population. The government is perfectly informed about the amount of 
resources (G) required to serve the demands of the general population to a degree that 
ensures the maintenance of the status quo and accurately informs the elites. Based on this 
information, the elites decide upon their particular contribution. The total sum of their 
contributions corresponds to the value T. 
The degree to which T fulfils G influences the probability of a revolt, as the higher the 
contribution, the more that demands can be satisfied by public action and, consequently, 
the less attractive revolting becomes for the citizens. The probability of a revolt is defined 
by the convex function 
f(T, G)= 1 െ ට୘ୋ  
Hence, the probability of revolting is decreasing in T at a decreasing rate.34 This 
corresponds to the notion that tax contributions at lower overall levels are comparatively 
more efficient and effective in reducing the probability of revolt than contributions at 
higher levels; this is because low contributions will already have convinced broad 
                                                 
33  It is important to underline that the concept of revolt should be understood in a broad sense, including 
different types of socio-political sanctions and not necessarily a violent uprising aiming at regime 
change. 
34  The shape for the probability function represents an assumption. It is surely a simplification of the 
reality, and alternative shapes are possible, as will be discussed in the following section. Yet, assuming a 
convex function seems reasonable, given the collective action problems that the general population faces 
in organising a revolt. 
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segments of the society to reject a revolt. Still, the higher the fulfilment of G, the lower the 
probability of a revolt.35  
In essence, the elites face a maximisation problem: maximise the payoff given the 
probability function of revolt and their payoffs in case of preservation of the status quo 
(STQ) and in case of a revolt (REV).  
For the case of a strongly cohesive elite coalition (CEC) – as conceived in the previous 
chapter, in which all relevant elites are able to act as one – the utility function is defined as 
ܧܷ஼ா஼ሺܶ, ܩ, ܵܶܳ, ܴܧܸሻ ൌ ඨTG STQ൅ ቌ1 െ ඨ
T
G ቍREVെ T (1)
subject to the constraint that 0 ≤ T ≤ G36 and T< STQ- REV.37 Based on this constraint 
T ൌ 	 ሺୗ୘୕ି	ୖ୉୚ሻమସୋ  defines the contribution T that maximises the coalition’s utility.
38  
This result has two major implications. On the one hand, the more the elites benefit from 
the status quo – or the more they lose in case of a revolt – the more they will be willing to 
pay via taxes. The point is that while the denominator remains constant, higher values for 
STQ or lower values for REV will produce a higher numerator, which will lead to an 
increase of the contribution T that maximises the utility.  
On the other hand, in the range between G ≤ ୗ୘୕ି	ୖ୉୚ଶ  T is increasing in G, whereas for 
G	 ൐ 	 	STQെ	REV2  the value T maximising the coalition’s utility is decreasing in G.39 Hence, 
increasing the demand for redistribution (G) does not necessarily lead to more revenue 
and, in fact, sticking to modest demands can increase the contributions of elites.  
To exemplify the logic of the model, consider the following situation40: the general 
population demands 9 in order to not revolt (G = 9), and the strongly cohesive elite 
coalition values the status quo with 15 and the revolt with 2. Under these circumstances 
                                                 
35  To get a sense of the function, paying zero will surely lead to revolt, as no citizen will be willing to 
accept the status quo; paying half of the demanded value G decreases the probability of a revolt already 
to 0.29; finally, paying the full amount of G, which means satisfying all demands of the general 
population, decreases the probability of a revolt to 0. 
36  The point is that contributing more than G would be a waste of resources. If we assume that the only 
driver for paying taxes is lowering the probability of revolt, contributing above the demanded value G is 
always less profitable than sticking to G.  
37  As I assume T > 0, this second assumption implies that the status quo is more attractive than the 
scenario in case of a revolution. If this is not the case, the elite coalition would never pay any amount, as 
it would have no interest in supporting the status quo. 
38  See Appendix 1. The utility function for a unitary elite coalition would be identical, as in practice, there 
is no difference between a unitary elite coalition and a plural – but strongly cohesive – coalition. 
39  See Appendix 2.  
40  This situation will be used to exemplify the effect of certain factors on the contribution of elites in other 
sections. 
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the contribution T that maximises the elite coalition’s utility is 4.7.41 In practice, paying 
this amount ensures that the status quo will prevail with a 0.72 probability. 
3.2. Factionalism and the contributions of elites 
The game described above provides some hints about factors driving the tax contribution 
of elites. Yet, the model is based on the assumption of the existence of a strongly cohesive 
elite coalition. This implies overlooking the potential effect that factionalism within the 
coalition can have on the tax contributions. To analyse this aspect, consider the same basic 
game as above, but in this case a division of the elite coalition into two factions Fi (i = 1; 
2). Based on the previous logic, these factions face jointly, as a coalition, the demand G 
posed by the government on behalf of the general population. Again, every faction has a 
particular payoff from maintaining the status quo (STQi) and from the occurrence of a 
revolt (REVi), and each faction can decide individually about the level of their 
contribution ti. In contrast to the situation in the game with a strongly cohesive elite 
coalition, in this case, the probability function for a revolt depends on the joint 
contribution of the two factions (T), which is the sum of the particular contributions ti. 
fሺݐଵ, ݐଶ, ܩሻ ൌ 1 െ ඨt1 ൅ t2G (2)
Hence the utility function for each faction is  
ܧܷி௜ሺݐ௜, t~୧, ܩ, STQ୧, REV୧ሻ ൌ ඨt୧ ൅ t~୧G STQ୧ ൅ ቌ1 െ ඨ
t୧ ൅ t~୧
G ቍREV୧ െ t୧	 (3) 
Before analysing the difference to the case with a strongly cohesive elite coalition, two 
main aspects deserve special attention. First, in the absence of an institution that is able to 
enforce agreements between the factions, no arrangement that is agreed upon between 
them can be considered binding.42 As a consequence, being unable to negotiate a binding 
arrangement, the factions have to assume that t~୧ is equal to 0, as long as they do not have 
any additional information.  
Second, connected to the problem addressed above, the government cannot credibly split 
the value of G among the existing factions. The point is that the government cannot target 
shares of G and credibly ensure that paying these will be enough for the factions to be 
shielded in case of revolt. Hence, the factions act as if government were demanding the 
full value G from each of them.  
                                                 
41  To exemplify the effect of changing G, a change in G from 9 to 6.5 would lead to an increase in the 
contribution to 6.5.  
42  The government cannot credibly assume this role, as it cannot coercively act against any member of the 
elite coalition (see Section 2.2.3). 
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Imagine as a first step a rather simple scenario. The elite coalitions are characterised by 
two factions. Both factions share the payoffs for STQ and REV homogeneously.43 In this 







The effect of factionalism seems to be remarkable. Using the example on page 16 as a 
starting point, the splitting of the elite coalition into two factions that share identical 
values for STQ and REV leads to the contributions of each of them to be as low as 1.17.45 
The decrease can be explained by the fact that, in comparison to the situation for a unitary 
elite coalition, the value for REV and STQ decreased for each faction, producing a lower 
numerator,46 whereas the value G remained constant. Consequently, the contribution 
maximising the utility for each faction decreases in comparison to the contribution that a 
potential unitary elite coalition would make. Even considering the joint contribution of 
both factions (2.35), the contribution is far lower than the one a unitary elite coalition 
would pay under identical circumstances (4.7).47  
The greater the factionalisation of the elite coalition, the stronger the negative effect on the 
particular contribution. In this sense, the more factionalised the elite coalition, the lower 
their joint contribution.48  
Arguably, dividing the values for REV and STQ homogeneously among the coalition’s 
factions can be considered unrealistic. Instead, it seems more plausible that the particular 
values for STQ and REV will be unevenly distributed among them. This brings up the 
question whether a certain distribution of payoffs among the factions exists, which leads 
to a higher joint contribution than the one that a unitary elite coalition would pay. 






4G  (5) 
                                                 
43  In this case the values for STQ and REV are simply divided by two. 
44  T ൌ 	 ሺୗ୘୕ି	ୖ୉୚ሻమସୋ 	maximises the utility for a unitary elite coalition. As, in this case, REV and STQ are 
homogeneously divided among the factions, both factions assume t~୧ ൌ 0 and both factions face the full 
demand of G; the equation maximising the T is identical to the one for a strongly cohesive elite coalition 
but substituting REV and STQ respectively by ୖ୉୚ଶ 	and 
ୗ୘୕
ଶ  . 
45  G is maintained at 9. The values attached to the status quo and revolt change respectively from 15 to 7.5 
and from 2 to 1. Hence the result of t୧ ൌ 	 ሺୗ୘୕୧ିୖ୉୚୧ሻ
మ
ସୋ  is 1.17. This implies that the coalition member 
pays until securing a 0.36 probability for the status quo as outcome.  
46  ሺୗ୘୕ଶ െ
ୖ୉୚
ଶ ሻ is always lower than ሺSTQ െ REVሻ. 
47  One could argue that the assumption that governments cannot target shares of G is too strong. 
Nevertheless, the existence of a problem in simply dividing the burden among factions is undeniable and 
even small restrictions in this capacity lead to remarkable drops in the tax contributions as compared to 
ones of a strongly cohesive elite faction. 
48  See Appendix 3.  
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Considering that REV = REVଵ ൅ REVଶ	and STQ = STQଵ ൅ STQଶ	this inequality can be 
rewritten as 





4G 	 (6) 
Assuming G > 0, the inequality only holds under two conditions: if REVଵ	>	STQଵ and 
REVଶ	<	STQଶ or if REVଵ <	STQଵ and 	REVଶ	> STQଶ. Consequently, in order for the joint 
contribution of a factionalised elite coalition to be higher than the contribution of a unitary 
elite coalition, at least one of the factions needs to be better off in case of a revolt. The 
driver of this situation is that one of the factions benefits so much from the status quo that 
it accepts to contribute a lot to maintain it. The problem is that such a scenario would be 
very unstable. The faction that would be better off in case of a revolt would be looking for 
an alternative elite coalition that could stabilise another political settlement associated 
with higher particular benefits. Moreover, due to the problem of enforcement of contracts, 
a solution using side payments is problematic to envision.49  
Yet, the analysis above shows that the overall contribution of a factionalised elite coalition 
in which the factions unevenly share the payoffs of STQ and REV is higher than the one 
of an elite coalition that is divided into uniform factions. 
To exemplify this insight, based again on the main model described on page 16, imagine 
that the unitary elite coalition is divided in two factions. For faction one, STQ1 equals 10 
and REV1 equals -2, whereas for faction two STQ2 equal 5 and REV2 equal 2. G remains 
at 9 for both factions. The first faction maximises its utility by contributing 4, whereas the 
second does so by contributing 0.25. Consequently, the joint contribution is 4.25. This is 
higher than the joint contribution expected from a coalition factionalised into two uniform 
groups (2.35),50 but remains lower than the contribution expected from a unitary elite 
coalition (4.7).  
All in all, this subsection suggests that, all else being equal, an increasing degree of 
factionalisation leads to lower overall tax contributions by the members of the elite 
coalition. The main problem is that the government cannot guarantee the different factions 
that other contributions will be in place, nor that paying a certain share of G will shield 
them in case of revolt. Consequently, factions would have to behave as if they were 
bearing the complete demand of G and face the revolutionary threat alone. This 
necessarily lowers the incentives to contribute, as buying stability becomes more costly 
and comparatively less attractive. 
3.3. Information availability and the contributions of elites  
The previous analysis is based on the idea that factions within the elite coalition cannot 
make binding agreements on how much they will contribute because there is no outside 
                                                 
49  Side payments are transfers that are made among the players of a game after it is finished. This could 
still be used to make supporting the status quo attractive for the less privileged member of the elite 
coalition. However, this requires the existence of a credible institution that is able to enforce this 
agreement (Morrow 1994, 111–113). 
50  See page 16. 
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institution that can ensure that the agreements will be enforced. This makes the fact about 
whether they can communicate irrelevant, because regardless of what they communicate, 
the problem of enforcement persists. The issue is different when discussing the availability 
of information about other factions’ tax contributions.  
In the previous section, factions were assumed to have no information about the actual or 
potential contributions of other factions. One could argue that this does not appear to be a 
realistic scenario.  
In the following, I discuss two scenarios – one in which one faction has precise 
information about how much the other faction has or is willing to pay, and another in 
which the information concerns the range in which the contribution of the other faction 
will fall. The results suggest that there is no strategic complementarity between the 
contributions51 and that, in fact, the information about actual or potential contributions of 
other factions leads to a decrease in the amount of one’s own contributions. The key is that 
knowing how much other factions will contribute offers the possibility to free-ride.52  
Imagine that F1 knows with certainty the amount that F2 has contributed, for example 
thanks to a leak from the Ministry of Finance. In this case, the utility function for F1 would 
be the same as in the previous section (function number 3). 
ܧܷி௜ሺݐ௜, t~୧, ܩ, STQ୧, REV୧ሻൌ 	ට୲౟ା ୲~౟ୋ STQ୧ ൅ ቆ1 െ ට
୲౟ା ୲~౟
ୋ ቇREV୧ െ t୧	 (3) 
Yet, in this case, ܨ௜ does not have to assume t~୧ equals 0, as it knows its precise value. 
Consequently, the value ݐ௜ that maximises the utility for ݐ௜ is no longer t୧ ൌ ሺ	ୗ୘୕౟ି	ୖ୉୚౟ሻ
మ




The comparison between the two latter equations makes it evident that the availability of 
information has a negative effect on the contribution of the faction with this information. 
In fact, any contribution that is known to be surely paid by other factions is fully 
subtracted from the contribution that the particular faction would make in case of not 
having any information.  
                                                 
51  The concept of strategic complementarity is described in McCarty / Meirowitz (2007, 131–133). The 
contributions would be strategic complements if the contributions of each faction were to increase the 
contributions of the other factions. As this section shows, this is not the case and one’s own 
contributions decrease in response to an increase of other elites’ contributions. 
52  This analysis is based on the idea that the factions try to maximise benefits in a one-shot game scenario, 
although paying tax contributions can be rather seen as a repeated game. The tax administrations will 
demand contributions every year. Moreover, the high amount of tax reforms in most countries in the 
world indicates that these taxes are subject to constant discussions and bargaining. However, the 
national tax-to-GDP ratios tend to be remarkably stable over time (Bird / Martinez-Vazquez / Torgler 
2008, 56–58). This suggests that although details of tax legislations and systems might vary over time, 
the main lines of the performance of the tax system remain considerably stable within each country. As 
expressed by Bird, Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler: “What is right, or at least feasible, in Chile or 
Brazil, for example, is likely to continue to differ from what may be sustainable in Colombia or 
Honduras” (2008, 58). This point is closely connected to the idea of political equilibrium and supports 
conceptualising the definition of the tax contributions by members of the elite coalition as a one-shot 
game.  
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The situation does not change if the information is not about a precise value that another 
faction will pay, but rather about a certain range defining upper and lower boundaries for 
the contributions. Imagine, for example, that the elite coalition is composed of two 
factions (ܨଵ and ܨଶ ).	ܨଵ knows that ܨଶ’s contribution will be between two boundaries, a high 
value ݕ and a low value ݕ. In addition, ܨଵ knows that the probability of paying any value 
between ݕ and ݕ is constantly distributed. 
The corresponding utility function for ܨଵ is:  
ܧܷிଵ ቀݐଵ, ݕ, ݕ , ܩ, STQଵ, REVଵቁ ൌඨ୲భା	
೤శ೤
మ




ୋ ൲REVଵ െ tଵ	 (7) 
Solving the first order condition for the value t1 leads to the result that53  
t	1 ൌ 	ሺSTQଵ െ REVଵሻ
ଶ െ 2ܩݕ െ 2ܩݕ
4ܩ  (8) 
is the value for t1, which maximises the payoff for F1. 
It is evident that the availability of this kind of information leads to lower contributions. 
As long as the values ݕ and ݕ are higher than 0, t will be lower than in a context of no 
information. The lower the values of the range, the lower the decrease in the contribution, 
as െ	2ܩݕ 	െ 2ܩݕ will become smaller. Hence, the information availability about the others’ 
contributions always has a negative effect on the amount of one’s own contribution.54 
All in all, the results of this subsection indicate that, all else being equal, in a factionalised 
elite coalition, the availability of information concerning other factions’ contributions 
univocally leads to a reduction of the contributions of the faction that has that information. 
Thus, the analysis suggests that if the members of a factionalised coalition have access to 
this information, their overall contribution should decrease significantly. 
3.4. The government’s credibility and its capacity to increase the contributions 
of elites  
The analyses in the two previous sections indicate that factionalisation of the elite 
coalition and availability of information about the factions’ contributions leads to lower 
                                                 
53  The first derivative for t1 is	ܧܷிଵ′ ቀݐଵ, ݕ, ݕ	, ܩ, STQଵ, REVଵቁ ൌ ି√ଶ	ሺୗ୘୕భିୖ୉୚భሻ
ଶீටమ೟భశ೤శ೤	ಸ 	
െ 1. Equating it to 0 and 
solving it for t leads to the result in equation 8. 
54  There is one case in which the information about other member’s contributions can lead to an increase 
in the amount of one’s own contribution. It demands that the general population enforce a minimum 
contribution, below which the probability of revolt would not decrease in T (i.e. tax contributions below 
that level would have no diminishing effect on the probability of a revolt). Under these circumstances, it 
can be the case that knowing that other members would bear some of the demands can make 
contributing attractive, whereas not having this information would lead to the contribution being zero. 
This is an interesting but extreme situation that remains outside the scope of this paper. 
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overall tax contributions of elites. This is even more striking as, in practice, these aspects 
can be expected to increase during the process of socio-economic and democratic 
development. For example, factionalism could be connected to democratisation55 and 
information availability to transparency. In this sense, one could argue that the 
achievement of certain development goals that are considered desirable from a normative 
perspective can lead to lower tax revenues, and consequently to less capable states. In 
other words, the previous analysis raises the question of whether countries are condemned 
to lower contributions of elites during a positive socio-economic and democratic 
development. Fortunately, empirical data tell us that this is not the case. At least for the 
highly developed countries and those considered to be at the high end of the democratic 
spectrum, not only are their overall tax revenues high, but also the collection of taxes, 
which are commonly assumed to have a comparatively strong impact on elites, is 
remarkable. Yet, for instance, Garcia / von Haldenwang (forthcoming) suggest that tax 
performance in countries located around the middle of the spectrum between democracy 
and autocracy is comparatively lower than in countries located at any of the extremes. 
Without precise data on the revenue composition of these countries, this empirical 
observation to a certain extent supports the arguments made above. It appears that the 
level of democracy in particular – or external pressure on elites more generally – has no 
linear positive effect on tax performance. Moreover, the fact that – aside from the 
worldwide democratic trend during the last decade – the gap in tax collection in most 
developing countries, as compared to OECD countries, is connected to a lower collection 
of arguably more progressive taxes supports the idea that developing countries have 
problems getting their elites to carry a fair share of the tax burden.56 
Yet, if democracy and external pressure are not able to increase the contributions of elites, 
then what can? Analysing the following equation, which defines the contribution that 
maximises the utility for a unitary elite coalition, helps when thinking about potential 
alternatives. 
T ൌ ሺSTQ െ REVሻ
ଶ
4G (9) 
As already discussed, lowering REV or increasing STQ increases the level of the tax 
contributions that the coalition accepts to pay. Also lowering G within a certain range of 
values leads to higher tax contributions of elites. Besides influencing these parameters, 
there is theoretically the option of changing the revolt probability function to a more 
                                                 
55  Faust makes the argument that democratisation “opens up the political process and leads to a quick 
division of the homogenous group of those opposed to autocracy into a set of new political actors and 
interest groups: poor peasants, urban workers, ethnic minorities and diverse segments of the middle 
class” (2010, 521). In my view, these arguments can be expanded to more general processes, leading to 
the encouragement of political pluralism. As highlighted by Faust: “collective actors with the incentive 
to aggregate the diversity of societal demands into comprehensive political programmes” (2010, 522) 
are key to counteract the negative effect of factionalisation. Precisely the lack of these actors is one of 
the main characteristics of societies in developing countries and explains why democracies in 
developing countries can more commonly be labelled as factionalised.  
56  In empirical terms, it is well documented that the improvements of developing countries in tax 
performance have been mainly driven by a higher rate of collection of regressive taxes. A case where 
democracy has particularly failed to increase the contributions of elites is Latin American (Di John 
2008), but for Africa data suggest similar tendencies (AfDB/OECD 2010, 93). 
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aggressive shape.57 Interestingly, only the last options goes in line with the argument that 
increasing external pressure on elites will lead to higher contributions,58 whereas all others 
are based precisely on the opposite logic.  
Regardless of which approach is taken, in practice, the general population faces vast 
collective action problems to implement any of them. In addition, as for the last option, it 
requires a substantial change of the socio-political context,59 and the positive effect of this 
kind of process on the tax contributions of privileged segments of society is disputed.60 
The capacity of the government to influence the parameters defining the elites’ 
contributions differs remarkably from the capacity of the general population in one 
respect. Normally, if we think about increasing tax performance by working with 
governmental organisations, we think in terms of strengthening monitoring capacities. As 
discussed in previous sections, this strategy, which is based on sidestepping political 
settlements, has limitations, especially when dealing with elites. There are no reasons to 
expect that governments will have fewer problems than the general population in 
influencing the parameters REV and G as well as the revolt probability function. 
However, in contrast to the general population, based on the fiscal contract paradigm (e.g. 
Timmons 2005), the government has the often overlooked capacity to influence parameter 
STQ by proposing deals to particular elites that encompass an exchange of higher tax 
contributions for the implementation of certain measures.  
To illustrate the main logic of the argument, in the following figure, I graph the utility 
functions for a unitary elite coalition. The calculations are based on assuming a value of 
10 for G and a value of 2 for REV. As the figure shows, the greater the values of STQ, the 
greater the values of T, which maximise the utility. Hence, even if the external pressure 
stays the same, the overall contributions of the members of the elite coalition should 
increase with the increasing attractiveness of STQ.   
                                                 
57  For example, if the general population were able to change the probability function from ሺ1 െ ට்ீሻ to 
the linear function ቀ1 െ ்ீቁ, the  strongly cohesive elite coalition would be willing to pay the full amount 
G as long as ܵܶܳ െ ܴܧܸ ൐ ܩ (see Appendix 4). Even less-ambitious changes such as defining a 
minimal contribution ݃ – below which the probability of revolt would not decrease in T – can achieve 
remarkable increases in contributions (see Appendix 5). 
58  In fact, rather than increasing pressure on the elites, which is connected to the parameter G, the idea here 
is increasing the threat while maintaining pressure, which is somehow different. 
59  For a discussion on the collective action problems faced by the general population in creating a credible 
revolution threat, see Acemoglu / Robinson (2006a, 120–128). Closely related to this discussion, 
Hossain / Moore assert that negative drivers appear to be suffering an “apparent impotence” (2002, 12) 
in the contemporary world. 
60  For a discussion on this, see Timmons (2010), who underlines the link between more representation and 
higher collection rates of regressive taxes. Also Beramendi / Rueda (2007) note how, at least in 
developed democracies, increases in tax revenue in countries with social democratic governments are 
based predominantly on indirect, supposedly rather regressive taxes. 
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But is the idea of the government offering a good deal to elites a realistic approach? Some 
scholars are sceptical about this. Not primarily about the capacity of the government to 
make such an offer, but rather about the prospects of this kind of offer being accepted by 
the other side in negotiations. For example, Ascher argues that interest groups will always 
operate in a defensive mode against taxation because “there are so many steps between 
revenue collection and expenditures that no group can count on a sure and significant 
increase in benefits” (1989, 419). This call for caution is understandable, but I would 
warn against deriving the conclusion that it is implausible for actors to accept paying more 
taxes in the expectation of getting more benefits. In my opinion, Ascher’s argument points 
at the fact that uncertainty can strongly bias preferences of the elites towards rejecting 
scenarios that could benefit them comparatively more. The consequence is not just that 
these groups miss the benefits of these options but also that society, more generally, is 
locked into equilibriums that are suboptimal for all actors (Fernandez / Rodrik 1991). 
The key is that elites evaluate different scenarios based on expected benefits and not on 
the objective existence of benefits. Even if they realise the potential benefits from a deal 
with the government, the more uncertain the realisation of these benefits are, the less 
attractive financing the required measures will be. Consequently, the main problem is one 
of credible commitment.  
In addition to this point, based on the discussions in the previous sections, I would argue 
that the patterns of interaction within the elite coalition are crucial for the capacity of the 
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government to influence tax contributions.61 Against a strongly cohesive elite coalition, 
the governmental proposals must respect the limits of state action agreed upon by all 
coalition members. Hence, very specific proposals that benefit only one faction would not 
have any effect, as they would be commonly vetoed by other coalition members. In 
contrast, in highly factionalised elite coalitions, the arrangement among the coalition is 
less substantial and detailed. Therefore, given a credible government, it has more policy 
space to define particular arrangements with individual factions without the approval of 
other coalition members. As a result, the possibilities to successfully offer targeted 
benefits to particular coalition members increase in factionalised contexts. This does not 
mean that a unitary coalition will never react to attractive proposals by the government, 
yet it implies that the influence of credible governments should be stronger in a context of 
factionalism.  
All in all, the arguments made above suggest that governments can far more easily create 
the conditions for achieving greater tax contributions of elites than can the general 
population. Strategies based on increasing pressure on elites are complex to implement 
and require a lot of time before results can be seen. In contrast, compared to the general 
population, the government – by aligning state action with the elites’ interests – can 
increase contributions by making the status quo more attractive more rapidly. 
Governmental credibility and reliability is key in this effort. Moreover, I argue that the 
effect of governmental credibility should be much stronger for factionalised elite 
coalitions than for cohesive ones, as the political space to make profitable deals is broader 
in the latter. 
4 Conclusion and implications for development cooperation 
As Timmons underlines, “social scientists have expended considerable energy trying to 
answer who gets what, when and how. Far fewer papers have addressed the flipside of the 
question – who pays what, when, and how” (2010, 191). Against this background, as a 
first step in the broader aim of understanding the determinants of diverse revenue 
structures in developing countries, this paper has focussed on gaining theoretical insights 
into when and why elites pay tax contributions and the circumstances under which these 
can increase.  
In particular, I call for a shift in the theoretical approach to taxation. Analysis should not 
focus exclusively on the interaction between elites and the general population but should 
also consider carefully the interaction among elites themselves. Starting from the analysis 
of the commonly overlooked collective action challenge among elites, I have analysed 
how three concrete factors affect the amount of taxes that elites are willing to pay: level of 
factionalism among elites; information about other elites’ tax contributions; and the 
capacity of the government to make credible offers to fulfil particularistic interests. The 
analysis shows that increasing factionalism and information availability about other elites’ 
contributions have a negative effect on the level of tax contributions. On the contrary, the 
credibility of the government has a positive effect on the elites’ tax contributions and can, 
                                                 
61  This argument strongly relies on the argument made by Gehlbach / Keefer (2011) about the mechanisms 
by which autocratic leaders are able to make credible commitments to investors. 
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under certain circumstances, partly limit the previously identified negative effect of 
factionalisation. 
The challenge posed by factionalism is clear. In absence of an institution that is able to 
enforce agreements, the demands from the general population cannot be divided among 
the factions. As a result, each faction has to act as if it were required to pay the entire 
demanded amount for maintaining the status quo. Accordingly, paying for ensuring the 
status quo becomes less attractive and tax contributions decrease. Similarly, the 
availability of information about the contributions of other coalition members lowers the 
tax contributions, as it offers the possibility to free-ride. Lastly, a credible government can 
increase the incentives for contributing by making the status quo more attractive, and 
hence worth paying for. In this context, it is important to note that the more cohesive the 
pattern of interaction among elites, the less influence that the credibility of a government 
will have. 
The conclusions of this theoretical analysis help to go “beyond the broad generalisation 
that politics matter” (Unsworth 2009, 886) for taxation in developing countries and should 
be considered carefully by development cooperation. First, the paper sends a warning. 
Although overall tax performance is important, development cooperation should not 
overlook that the question of who pays taxes is at least as relevant as the question of how 
much is collected in tax revenues. Hence, the performance of different tax types and the 
contributions made by particular groups should receive as much attention as aggregated 
collection data. 
Second, the paper points out that politics are important for evaluating the prospects of 
measures to improve tax collection. This is certainly not a new message, but unfortunately 
stressing and repeating the relevance of the political economy of taxation seems necessary. 
Everyone must recall that, to a certain extent, the reality of taxation mirrors the strategic 
constellations in place. Hence, if development cooperation aspires to support fairer and 
higher-performing tax systems, it must not only take into account what is technically and 
economically desirable, but also what is politically feasible. To achieve this, development 
cooperation cannot perceive politics as an obstacle to be overcome, but rather as a 
necessary part of the solution (Unsworth 2009, 887). Hence, a proper consideration and 
understanding of how attitudes, interests and perceptions of elites shape what is politically 
feasible are crucial. Two main drivers are able to enlarge the space of what is politically 
feasible: positive and negative drivers of taxation. The required conditions for the 
emergence of these drivers are different, as are their practical implications. The advantage 
of strategies based on negative drivers of taxation is that governments receive extra 
revenue that they can allocate freely. However, in general, supporting positive drivers of 
taxation seems more appealing for development cooperation, due to the fact they do not 
require changes in the strategic constellations and can potentially bring results in the short 
term. The key is that whereas negative drivers raise the contributions of elites by changing 
the socio-political context, positive drivers do so by activating a tax potential that, in 
practice, already exists. Therefore, the problem of positive drivers is not so much one of 
socio-political transformation, but rather one of policy design and policy framing. 
Development cooperation is for obvious reasons more comfortable in dealing with the 
latter aspects, and, in addition, these are also the aspects it can more easily have an impact 
on. 
Overall, the paper leads to the following main messages for development cooperation: 
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1. Sweetening the carrot is often more feasible and goal-orientated than supporting 
a stronger stick. 
Trying to influence power constellations in order to increase pressure on elites to pay 
more taxes is often less goal-orientated than striving to realise the potential that the 
existing ones offer. Wagering on the strategy to empower the general population is an 
uncertain strategy, which, if at all effective, requires a long time to evolve. By 
contrast, partly aligning with the interests of the powerful sectors of the society and 
finding the “best fit” (Booth 2012) can lead more easily and effectively to higher 
contributions, from which broad segments of the society can benefit. This requires that 
development agencies invest in context-specific knowledge and in political-economy 
analytical skills, but they should also engage in an open and frank discussion within 
the broader development cooperation community about the goals that development 
cooperation should be aiming at.62  
2. Concentrate on reducing uncertainty and supporting the identification of sectors 
in which common gains are possible. 
Positive drivers of taxation require that tax contributions be seen as a profitable 
investment. Limiting uncertainty is a crucial factor for making investments attractive. 
Hence, the existence of a credible and reliable state is crucial for increasing the tax 
contributions of elites.  
Fortunately, development cooperation can make a great contribution in this respect by 
supporting confidence-building measures as well as by developing persuasive and 
credible narratives linking taxation to the interest of elites (Moore / Putzel 1999).63 
Moreover, development cooperation can also make a valuable contribution in helping 
governments in developing countries to identify sectors in which the interests of elites 
and the general population overlap. Last, but certainly not least, from a less technical 
and more political perspective, development cooperation can serve as a mediator and 
an informal reinforcer of arrangements by supporting and monitoring their 
implementation.  
3. Acknowledge that measures to enhance tax performance can be in conflict with 
other measures pursuing different development goals.  
Development cooperation must be aware of the interaction between measures 
designed to enhance tax performance and measures aiming at other development 
goals. This is especially relevant when designing measures connected to the idea of 
positive drivers of taxation. One could argue that improving tax performance on the 
basis of positive drivers can add to the reinforcement and stabilisation of unfair 
political settlements. If this is the case, there are reasons to expect that strategies based 
on these kinds of drivers will have negative impacts on other more normative goals of 
development cooperation, such as, for example, democratisation. In addition, besides 
immediate side effects, the consequences of strategies based on positive drivers of 
                                                 
62  Otherwise the main goals and values of development cooperation would be violated. The conflict in 
objectives that can arise by basing a strategy to increase tax revenue on aligning with the interests of 
powerful actors is addressed below. 
63  Moore / Putzel (1999) refer to this in the context of the political economy of pro-poor policies; yet, the 
same arguments can be employed in the context of political economy of high tax performance. 
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taxation on long-term development of partner countries must be considered (Khan 
2010). Development cooperation must work on tools to evaluate these risks in order to 
identify satisfying trade-offs and design consistent measures.64 
In conclusion, this paper represents a call for international actors supporting 
developing countries in tax matters to take politics into account in order to identify the 
more effective, efficient and coherent strategy in supporting the emergence of higher-
performing and fairer tax systems in developing countries. It proposes that the 
interaction among elites is the key dimension shaping tax performance and revenue 
structures as well as the feasibility of measures designed to change these aspects. 
Future research is needed to prove empirically the plausibility of the arguments 
presented in this paper as well as to test on a large N cross country statistical analysis 
the empirical expectations suggested.  
 
 
                                                 
64  An analysis of the conflicting objectives of development cooperation – although focussing on the field 
of democratisation – can be found in Grimm / Leininger (2012), Faust / Leiderer / Schmitt (2012) and 
Freyburg (2012). 
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Appendix 1 
The result of differentiating function 1 with respect to T is EUେ୉େ´(T, G, STQ, REV) =   





which is negative as long as STQ > REV, which I assume. Consequently, setting the first 
derivative to zero and solving for T (i.e. calculating the first order condition) gives us the 
value for T, which maximises the utility for a unitary elite coalition, namely: T = (ୗ୘୕ି ୖ୉୚)మସୋ   
Appendix 2 
The constraint 0 ≤ T ≤ G implies that the contribution T =  (STQ− REV)24G  will only maximise 
the coalition’s utility as long as G ≥  (STQ− REV)24G . If the demanded value is below this 
threshold, the coalition will just contribute G, although potentially it would accept paying 
more. As a result, if G <  ୗ୘୕ିୖ୉୚ଶ  the contribution T is increasing in G, whereas if 
G >  ୗ୘୕ିୖ୉୚ଶ  T is decreasing in G. 
This is graphically illustrated in the following plot. 
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The result indicates that having complete information about the strategic constellation, the 
government (and at a more abstract level, the general population) would be better off by 
reducing the demand to ୗ୘୕ିୖ୉୚ଶ . The logic is evident: the lower the demands, the less 
expensive it is for the elite coalition to ensure the outcome STQ, and hence also, the more 
accepting it is to pay for it. 
Appendix 3 
The contribution T that a strongly cohesive elite coalition is willing to pay is defined by 
T =  (STQ− REV)
2
4G . The overall contribution T (=∑ t୧୧ଵ ) of a coalition factionalised in n 





ସୋ . The inequality 
(ୗ୘୕ି ୖ୉୚)మ




ସୋ  hold as 
long as 1 >  √୬୬  , which is correct for all n >1. Consequently, a strongly cohesive coalition 
will always contribute endogenously more than a factionalised one. Moreover, the greater 













4G  hold as long as  
√୬
୬  > √
n+1
n+1  , which is again always correct for all n >1.  
Appendix 4  
A change of the revolt probability function to ቀ1 − ୘ୋቁ causes the utility function to change 
to EUେ୉େ(T, G, STQ, REV) =  ୘ୋ STQ + ቀ1 − ୘ୋቁ  REV − T. The first derivative for T is 
EUେ୉େ′(T, G, STQ, REV) = ୗ୘୕ିୖ୉୚ୋ − 1, which means that the first order condition is no longer 
dependent on T. Consequently, taking into consideration the condition that 0 ≤ T ≤ G, as 
long as the first derivative is positive, G will equal T. On the contrary, as long as ୗ୘୕ିୖ୉୚ୋ −
1 < 0  (the first derivative is negative), the contribution T will be zero. Solving the 
inequality for G, we get the result that as long as G < STQ − REV , the coalition will 
contribute the whole amount of G. 
Appendix 5  
Introducing a minimum value ݃ , below which the revolt probability function would not 
decrease in T, would mean a change of the shape from (1 − ට୘ୋ) to (1 − ට
୘ି ୥
ୋି ୥). To 
exemplify the effects, consider the situation described on page 16. The result for the 
contribution maximising the utility for the strongly cohesive elite coalition, assuming a 
revolt probability function (1 − ට୘ୋ), is 4.7. If the population were able to change the revolt 
probability function to (1 − ට୘ିଵୋିଵ), the elite coalition’s contribution would increase to 5.5.  
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The point is that the contribution that maximises the utility of the coalition moves from 
ሺୗ୘୕ିୖ୉୚ሻమ
ସୋ  to 
ିସ௚మା	ସ௚	ୋ	ାሺୗ୘୕ିୖ୉୚ሻమ
ସሺୋି௚ሻ . G and ݃ are per definition positive. In addition, G is also 
by definition bigger than	݃. Consequently, െ4݃2 ൅ 	4݃G 	is always positive and causes the 
numerator of ିସ௚
మା	ସ௚	ୋ	ାሺୗ୘୕ିୖ୉୚ሻమ
ସሺୋି௚ሻ  to always be bigger than the numerator of 
ሺୗ୘୕ିୖ୉୚ሻమ
ସୋ . In 
addition, as ݃ is positive, the denominator of ିସ௚మା	ସ௚	ୋ	ାሺୗ୘୕ିୖ୉୚ሻమସሺୋି௚ሻ  is always smaller than the 
one of ሺୗ୘୕ିୖ୉୚ሻ
మ
ସୋ . Consequently, 
ିସ௚మା	ସ௚	ୋ	ାሺୗ୘୕ିୖ୉୚ሻమ
ସሺୋି௚ሻ  will always be bigger than	
ሺSTQെ	REVሻ2
4G .  
It is interesting to note that the increasing effect is not always present. If the value of ݃	is 
too aggressive, meaning the minimal demand is very high, under certain circumstances 
this can lead to the elite coalition not paying any contributions at all. As long as ݃ is 
smaller than STQ-REV, the contribution will rise in ݃. But if ݃	is bigger than STQ-REV, 
then the elites will not pay at all. 
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